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STUDENT NOTES
CORPORATIONS - DISREGARD OF THE. CORPORATE
ENTITY
Two recent West Virginia decisionsi raise the problem as to
when the courts may disregard the concept of the corporation as
a separate and distinct legal entity. The rule is well established
in this2 and other jurisdictions3 that in ordinary, every-day busi-
ness transactions, such as the acquisition and transfer of property,-
the making of contracts,a and the institution and defense of suits,
the distinction between the corporation as a legal entity and sep-
arate personality, on the one hand, and its shareholders and officers,
upon the other hand, will be strictly maintained.7  Equally in
unison are the authorities which hold that in certain cases it is
imperative that the doctrine of separate corporate existence should
be ignored. Such exception to the general rule is seemingly pred-
icated upon the theory that the doctrine of separate corporate ex-
istence, being a mere fiction," introduced for convenience in the
transaction of business, may, like every other legal fiction be dis-
regarded when urged to an intent or purpose subversive to that for
which it was created.9 While such a rule affords little as a yard-
stick by which to measure the'cases, an analysis of the decisions
1 Southern Co-op. Foundry Co. v. Warlick Furniture Co., 185 S. E. 773 (W.
Va. 1936); Tynes v. Shore, 185 S. E. 845 (W. Va. 1936).
2 Moore v. Schoppert, 22 W. Va. 282 (1883) ; Transportation Co. v. Standard
Oil Co., 50 W. Va. 611, 40 S. E. 591 (1902).
3 Ulmer v. Lime Rock Ry. Co., 98 Me. 579, 57 Atl. 1001 (1904) ; Fietsam v.
Hay, 122 Ill. 293, 13 N. E. 501 (1887).
4 Park v. Petroleum Co., 25 W. Va. 108 (1884); Sellers v. Greer, 172 Ill.
549, 50 N. E. 246 (1898).
G Hall's Safe Co. v. Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Co., 146 Fed. 37 (C. C. A.
6th, 1906); Smith v. Parker, 148 id. 127, 45 N. E. 770 (1897).
0 Button v. Hoffman, 61 Wis. 20, 20 N. W. 667 (1884); Smith v. Hurd, 12
Mete. 371, 46 Am. Dee. 690 (Mass. 1847).
7 See Wormser, Disregard of Corporate Fiction (1923) 23 CoL. L. REv. 702-
715.
8 That the law is by no means settled whether the corporate personality is
to be regarded as a factual reality or a legal fiction see Colson, Corporate
.Personality (1936) 24 GEo. L. J. 638-652. Also see Note (1925) 13 CAL. L.
RBv. 235. Chief Justice Marshall in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat.
518 (1819) defined a corporation as "an artificial being, invisible, intangible
and existing only in contemplation of law". Note the language in People v.
North River Refining Co., 121 N. Y. 599, 622, 24 N. E. 834, 839 (1890) where
the court states: "The abstract idea of a corporation, the legal entity, the
impalpable and intangible creation of human thought, is itself a fiction, and
has been appropriately described as a figure of speech." Also see Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co. v. Pierson, 130 Misc. 110, 222 N. Y. Supp. 532 (1927).
0 State v. Standard Oil Co., 49 Ohio St. 137, 30 N. E. 279 (1892); Southern
Electric Securities Co. v. State, 91 Miss. 195, 44 So. 785 (1907).
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indicates that courts have tended to disregard the corporate entity
in the following situations.
1. Where a corporation is organized to perpetrate a fraud,
courts have held that they will look beyond the corporate unit to
the persons who are responsible for its existence. 10  Where the
corporate device is used to defraud creditors" or to evade existing
legal obligations 2 courts have had no difficulty in looking to the
real parties in interest. Such cases commonly involve attempts of
financially embarrassed individuals, 13 partnerships,'14 or corpora-
tions15 to transfer their assets to a "dummy, corporation" as a
means of evading their obligations. Creditors have under such
circumstances been allowed to reach the assets in the hands of the
"dummy" provided the rights of innocent shareholders therein
will not be adversely affected."" While such exception to the gen-
eral rule is well recognized by the courts, it is believed that in many
instances the lifting of the corporate veil is unnecessary to reach
the desired result. A transfer in fraud of creditors void when made
to a third party is no less subject to rescission by the creditors when
made to a "dummy corporation", even though such a corporation
be recognized as a separate and distinct legal entity." In Southern
Co-op. Foundry Co. v. Warlick Furniture Co.,'" an attempt was
made to transfer the assets of an insolvent furniture company to a
new corporation composed of the same officers and shareholders,
the purpose being to force creditors to accept a reduced settlement
of their claims. The West Virginia court held that the two cor-
30 THOMPSoN, COaRPOATIONS (3d ed. 1927) § 5445; Brundred v. Rice, 49
Ohio St. 640, 32 N. E. 169 (1892); First Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Trebein Co.,
59 Ohio St. 316, 52 N. E. 834 (1898).
1 Hibernia Ins. Co. v. St. Louis & New Orleans Transp. Co., 13 Fed. 516(E. D. Mo. 1882); Kellogg v. Douglas County Bank, 58 Han. 43, 48 Pac. 587
(1897).
12 Donovan v. Purtell, 216 Ill. 629, 75 N. E. 334 (1905); Higgins v. Cal.
Petroleum & Asphalt Co., 147 Cal. 663, 81 Pac. 1070 (1905).
13 Shumaker v. Davidson, 116 Iowa 569, 87 N. W. 441 (1901); First Nat.
Bank of Chicago v. Trebein Co., 59 Ohio St. 316, 52 N. E. 834 (1898).
1 n, re Rieger, Kapner & Altmark, 157 Fed. 609 (S. D. Ohio, 1907) ; Mul-
ford v. Doremus, 60 N. J. Eq. 80, 45 At]. 688 (1900); Colorado Trading &
Transfer Co. v. Acres Comm. Co., 18 Colo. App. 253, 70 Pac. 954 (1902).
"5 Montgomery Web Co. v. Dienelt, 133 Pa. 585, 19 Atl. 428 (1890).
16 Kellogg v. Douglas County Bank, 58 Kan. 43, 48 Pac. 587 (1897) ; Shu-
maker v. Davidson, 116 Iowa 569, 87 N. W. 441 (1901).
17 Once the intent to defraud, delay or hinder creditors is established, the
assets may be reached in the hands of a third party unless he be a bona fide
purchaser for value. That mere exchange of stock of a dummy corporation
for such assets will not suffice, see Note (1933) 85 A. L. R. 133.
18 Southern Co-op. Foundry Co. v. Warlick Furniture Co., 185 S. E. 773 (W.
Va. 1936).
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porations were in legal effect one and the same and that creditors of
the old company might collect in garnishment proceedings against
the new corporation. Such a decision is apparently justified upon
ground of fraud, although a similar result might have been
achieved, as has been suggested, on the ground of fraudulent con-
veyance.
2. Where a corporation has been used to evade an existing
statute or to modify its effect, courts have refused to be blinded by
the doctrine of separate corporate existence and have looked to
the true situation.19 Such cases often arise where a corporation
has been organized to perform a function or do an act which the
first corporation or individual is forbidden by law to perform.
Courts have tended in this situation to hold the act of such corpora-
tion as the act of the individual or corporation who controls it and
to whose ultimate benefit the act will inure.2 0  Thus where the
Pabst Brewing Company sought to evade provisions of the Ellins
Act against rebates by organizing a transit company to receive
such rebates the court held the transit company to be the mere
"alter ego" of the brewing company, the real beneficiary.21 Such
decisions are believed to be eminently sound, the corporate device
being used in such cases for an illegal purpose.
3. Where a corporation ig so organized and controlled as to
become the mere agent or instrumentality of another corporation,
courts have laid down the rule that the doctrine of corporate
$eparateness may be ignored.22 Under such a theory a parent
company has been held liable for the debts2 "- and even the negli-
gence and other torts24 of the subsidiary. Likewise, the assets of
19 United States v. Lehigh Valley Railroad, 220 U. S. 257, 31 S. Ct. 387
(1911) ; Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197, 24 S. Ct. 436
(1903); Miller & Lux v. East Side Canal Co., 211 U. S. 293, 29 S. Ct. 111(1908).
20 United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 Fed. 247 (E. D.
Wis. 1905); United States v. Lehigh Valley Railroad, 220 U. S. 257, 31 S. Ct.
387 (1911).
231 United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., ibid.
22 In re Muncie Pulp Co., 139 Fed. 546 (C. C. A. 2d, 1905); Seymour v.
Woodstock & Sycamore Traction Co., 281 Ill. 84, 117 N. E. 729 (1917).
23Luckenbach S. S. Co. v. W. R. Grace & Co., 267 Fed. 676 (C. C. A. 4th.,
1900); Stark Electric R. Co. v. McGinty Cont. Co., 238 Fed. 657 (C. C. A. 6th,
1917). Contra: New York Trust Co. v. Carpenter, 250 Fed. 668 (C. C. A. 6th,
1918); City of Holland v. Holland City Gas Co., 257 Fed. 679 (C. 0. A. 6th,
1919).
24 The Willen Van Driel, Sr., 252 Fed. 35 (C. C. A. 4th, 1918); Foard Co.
of Baltimore City v. Maryland, 219 Fed. 827 (C. C. A. 4th, 1914). Contra:
Union Sulphur Co. v. Freeport Texas Co., 251 Fed. 634 (D. C. Del. 1918);
Stone v. Railroad Co., 202 N. Y. 352, 95 N. E. 816 (1911).
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the subsidiary have been held available to the creditors of the bank-
rupt parent corporation. 5 Mere ownership of stock by the parent
company20 or ownership of stock in both companies by the same
individuals,2 7 however, will not justify disregard of their separate
entities. Likewise, the mere intermingling of affairs2 s or identity
of directors and officers,2" will not be held sufficient, but it must
appear also that the subordinate corporation was the "business
conduit" of the parent company." Despite the many generaliza-
tions of the courts to the effect that two corporations will be re-
garded as one and the same where one is the mere "agent", "tool"
or "dummy" of the other, a review of the authorities3' and an
analysis of the decisions leads to the conclusion that courts have
been influenced in such cases by the further fact that to recognize
their separate legal existence would result in a fraud, or injustice
to some third party.2" Indeed the tendency of the latest decisions
has been to expressly limit the rule to cases where adherence to the
separate entity doctrine would aid in consummation of a wvrong,3"
result in a fraud3 4 or work injustice to the rights of third parties"'
4. In the case of the one man corporation or the corporation
in which all stock is owned by a single individual, except a few
25 In Te Muncie Pulp Co., 139 Fed. 546 (C. C. A. 2d, 1905) ; In re Rieger,
Kapner & Altmark, 157 Fed. 609 (S. D. Ohio 1907).
26 Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 244 N. Y. 84, 355 N. E. 58 (1926); Hall
v. Chicago & N. W. By. Co., 133 Minn. 413, 158 N. W. 627 (1916).
27 Pittsburg-Buffalo Co. v. D3uncan, 232 Fed. 584 (C. C. A. 6th, 1918); Rich-
mond Const. Co. v. Richmond Ry. Co., 68 Fed. 105 (C. C. A. 6th, 1895).
28 1. re Watertown Paper Co., 169 Fed. 252 (C. C. A. 2d, 1909).
29 In Perry v. Ohio Valley Ry. Co., 70 W. Va. 697, 74 S. E. 993 (1912),
"It is not to be inferred that two corporations are in legal effect one and the
same, . . . because they have the same men as officers, [andJ employ the same
men as laborers .... " Ft. Smith Traction Co. v. Kelley, 91 Ark. 461, 327 S.
W. 975 (1910).
s0WoimsER, DIsREGAnD OF CORPORATE FICTION AND ALLIED PROBLEMS
(1929) 56.
31 See Ballantine, Separate Entity of Parent and Subsidiary Corporation
(1926) 60 Am. L. Rv. 19.
32 New York Trust Co. v. Carpenter, 250 Fed. 668 (C. C. A. 6th, 1918);
Erkenbrecher v. Grant, 187 Cal. 7, 200 Pae. 641 (1921).
33 Erkenbrecher v. Grant, ibid.; Ballantine, supra n. 31.
34 See Gledhill v. Fisher & Co., 272 Mich. 353, 262 N. W. 371 (1935) where
the court states, "Before the corporate entity may be properly disregarded
. . . it must be shown not only that undue domination and control was exer-
cised by the parent corporation over the subsidiary, but also that this control
was exercised in such a manner as to defraud and wrong the complainant, and
that unjust loss or injury will be suffered by the complainant as the result of
such domination unless the parent company be held liable." Also see North v.
Higbee Co., 131 Ohio St. 507, 3 N. E. (2d) 391 (1936).
35 New York Trust Co. v. Carpenter, 250 Fed. 668 (C. C. A. 6th, 1918) ; Fed.
Trade Comm. v. Thatcher Mfg. Co., 5 F. (2d) 615, 621 (C: C. A. 3d, 1925).
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shares necessary to qualify directors, courts have shown great
liberality in lifting the veil of the corporate entity and holding the
Oole shareholder and the corporation to be one and the same.38 The
test in such cases, again as in the case of the parent and subsidiary
corporation, seems to be one of substantial identity, ?. e., is the cor-
poration the "alter ego" of its owner ?7 Under such a theory the
corporation has been held liable for debts incurred in its name by
the sole shareholder without compliance with corporate formal-
ities.38 Likewise liability has been imposed on the sole shareholder
for the obligations of the corporation.3 9 Except for cases in a few
jurisdictions which suggest a policy of the law against one man
corporations, 40 there is apparently little justification for the dis-
regard of corporate entities on the mere ground that the corpora-
tion is owned by a single individual.41 Such decisions are in many
instances justified, however, by the further consideration that the
corporation was formed or being used for a fraudulent purpose,4 -
or to evade an obligation,43 or circumvent a restrictive covenant
upon the shareholder. 4  The recent decision of Tynes 'v. Shor6
45
•8 Walter & Co. v. Zuckerman, 214 Cal. 418, 6 P. (2d) 251 (1931); Briggs
& Co. v. Harper Clay Prod. Co., 150 Wash. 235, 272 Pac. 962 (1928). See Note
(1932) 45 HARv. L. REv. 1084; also see Note (1936) 14 CAN. BA REV. 663.
37 Wenban Estate v. Hewlett, 193 Cal. 675, 227 Pac. 723 (1924); State Nat.
Bank v. Encinal Mercantile Co., 277 S. W. 398 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
3s Commercial Surety Co. v. Modesto Drug Co., 43 Cal. App. 162, 184 Paa.
964 (1919); Gamer Paper Co. v. Tuscany, 264 S. W. 132 (Tex. Civ. App.
1924).
39 Minifle v. Rowley, 137 Cal. 481, 202 Pac. 673 (1922).
40 See Louisville Banking Co. v. Eisenman, 94 Ky. 83, 93, 21 S. W. 531, 532
(1893). "... the Legislature never intended to permit one person to cou-
duct his ordinary business in the name of a corporation, so as to exempt him
from personal liability, or his property not embraced by or used in his cor-
porate business from the payment of a debt for no other reason than its being
a debt of the corporation." See also The Bellona Company Case, 3 Bland 442,
446 (Md. 1831). Cf. First Nat. Bank of Gadsden v. Winchester, 119 Ala. 168,
172, 24 So. 351, 352 (1898).
41 WORMSEa, op. dt. supra n. 30, at 81. "The writer, although a firm be-
liever in the necessity for a frequent and liberal disregard of the concept Cf
corporate entity, believes that to ignore it simply because the number of share-
holders has become few or even one, is to convert an otherwise sane, safe, and
sensible policy into a 'reductio ad absurdum'." Elenkrieg v. Siebrecht, 238
N. Y. 254, 144 N. E. 519 (1924).
42 In re Berkowitz, 173 Fed. 1013 (D. C. N. J. 1908); Noble v. Burnett Co.,
208 Mass. 75, 94 N. E. 289 (1911).
43 Hagy v. Maguire, 147 Pa. 187, 23 Atl. 806 (1892); Nat. Conduit Mfg.
Co. v. Conn. Pipe Mfg. Co., 73 Fed. 491 (D. C. Conn. 1896).
44 eriell v. Prame, 206 Fed. 278 (C. C. A. 6th, 1913); Booth Co. v. Seibold,
37 Misc. 101, 74 N. Y. Supp. 776 (1902).
4. Tynes v. Shore, 185 S. E. 845 (W. Va. 1936).
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apparently places West Virginia in line with other jurisdictions
adopting the liberal rule in respect to one-man corporations. In
this case an individual was held liable for the debt of a corporation
whose stock he had purchased on the ground that when a corpora-
tion is merely a simulacrum appropriated to the personal business
of an individual, the corporate entity may be disregarded. It is
submitted that the court should be extremely cautious in the ap-
plication of such a rule and that in the ordinary situation all dis-
tinctions between the sole shareholder and the corporation should
be preserved. Only in the extreme case where necessary to pre-
vent fraud 0 or injustice to a third party 7 should the distinction
be ignored.
W. V. R.
46 Supra n. 42.
47 Bliggs & Co. v. Harper Clay Prod. Co.; Walter & Co. v. Zuckerman, both
supra n. 36.
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